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This interdisciplinary, social scientific analysis of the
regulatory discourse on nanotechnology in the three
German-speaking countries of Germany, Austria and
Switzerland and in the EU between 2000 and 2013 has
shown three distinct phases, characterised by shifts in the
configuration of actors and in the thematic scope from
nanotechnology to nano-materials. Compared to modes
of governance based on traditional statutory law, modes
of governance based on less binding forms of soft law
and self-regulation (like codes of conduct, guidelines and
certification systems) and newmodes of governance (like
assessment studies, risk management frameworks as well
as participatory and cooperative forms of communication
and negotiation) have gained importance. Despite some
similarities, two different cultures in governing nanotech-
nology can be distinguished: a product-oriented culture in
statutory regulations (when speaking about products, the
article is also referring to substances) and a risk-based
culture in applying soft law based on new modes of
governance. In addition, the different regulatory cultures
have led to four strategic approaches: modes of gover-
nance mainly based on hard law and soft law at the EU
level, modes of governance mainly based on cooperative
and self-regulatory approaches in Germany, cooperative
governance approaches in Austria and modes of gover-
nance mainly based on self-regulatory and soft law ap-
proaches in Switzerland.
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Introduction
Discourses on regulatory implications of nanotechnolo-
gy emerged in direct response to the launch of new
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research and development support programmes and ini-
tiatives in almost every Western industrialised nation in
the early 2000s. This early start of regulatory discourses,
compared to previous technological developments, was
associated with intensive efforts of assessment activities.
These started almost concurrently with the establishment
of national research initiatives [87], which mainly
consisted of traditional technology assessment (e.g.
[115, 124]), toxicological studies (e.g. [20, 42, 92, 112])
and analyses in ethical, legal and social implication
(ELSI) and cultural studies.1 Regulatory discourses, how-
ever, developed not only in almost every country in-
volved in research and development of nanotechnologies
but also on the supranational level of the European Union
(EU) and in international organisations, like the OECD.
Besides modes of governance based on statutory law
– referred to as ‘hard law’ and as such based on less
binding and more voluntary measures, referred to as
‘soft law’2 – lying in the jurisdiction of parliaments,
governments and administrations, various actors in the
field of nanotechnology have developed modes of gov-
ernance based on self-regulation and informal, distrib-
uted and participative approaches – referred to as ‘new
governance’ [116, 117]. As for example the current
trend in the EU shows, these two modes can coexist
(e.g. [55, 132]). In political discourses and in decision-
making related to science policy, a shift from “govern-
mental forms of regulation” to “governance” was de-
scribed [121]. Depending on the analytical perspective,
literature refers to a “governance turn” [21, 122], a
“deliberative turn” [72], a “qualitative turn” [88] or a
“turn from modernist to post-modernist forms of state-
craft” [68]; with regard to science and technology policy
reference is made to a “new governance of science” [67,
79, 86, 140]. Furthermore, the rise of a ‘new governance
turn’ has been described (e.g. [41, 102]). ‘New gover-
nance’ stands for informal regulatory approaches, like
technology and risk assessment, risk management
frameworks as well as participatory and cooperative
forms of communication and negotiation, combined
with forms of self-regulation (e.g. [55, 132]).
Against this background, this interdisciplinary,
social-scientific study, which is neither a legal nor a
sociological analysis, has evaluated regulatory dis-
courses on nanotechnology in the three European coun-
tries of Germany, Austria (both EU members) and Swit-
zerland (non-EU member), as well as at the EU level,
since 2000. This comparative study, has followed a
discourse analysis approach and has used methods from
both fields, like legal and document analysis, interviews
and participant observation of the authors in events and
panels of the regulatory discourse. The analysis has
focused on discourses carried out within governmental
institutions, like the parliament and administration, and
on discourses pursued outside government. It further
studied the related modes of governance based on hard
and soft law, as well as new modes of governance,
including self-regulatory approaches of non-
governmental organisations and the private sector, like
riskmanagement frameworks, various codes of conduct,
certification systems, safety guidelines and manuals of
manufacturers and industry associations. Moreover, in
the context of new governance, participatory approaches
like stakeholder dialogues and citizen conferences have
also been analysed, as have private regulatory assess-
ment reports and reports initiated by government on the
impact of technology, opportunities, risks and innova-
tion. Documents analysed consisted of legislative texts,
regulations, council minutes, printed materials, legal
opinions, documentations of informal approaches, re-
ports made by officials and other governmental organi-
sations and commissions aswell as reports from external
actors, like documentations of self-regulatory ap-
proaches, dialogue protocols etc.
The comparison is based on research approach
driven by qualitative science and technology stud-
ies (STS), using the concept of regulatory culture
[22 p. 73–76, 86 p. 21 seq.] The categories of
representation, participation and negotiation, de-
veloped by Jasanoff [86] for a comparison of
political cultures, have been further specified and
adapted for the needs of this study. It has become
clear that an analysis of a regulatory discourse that
aims to compare regulatory cultures requires dis-
cursive elements as well as practices of regulation
to be analysed. This has led to three analytical
categories: issues, actors and practices, and the
following analytical framework for the comparison:
& Issues: Which subjects, topics, contents and themes
are discussed in the regulatory discourse on
nanotechnology?
1 On ELSI and cultural studies analyses (see e.g. [3, 10, 30, 31, 65,
69, 70, 74, 75, 90, 93, 95, 96, 97, 103, 104, 111, 131]).
2 Such voluntary approaches consist of aspects like risk assess-
ment schemes, various codes of conduct and the establishment of
advisory boards and committees for dialogue (see e.g. [76, 89,
100]) for specific measures.
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& Actors: Who participates in regulatory discourses;
who is involved in governing nanotechnology and
who is not?
& Practices: What modes of governance and what
kind of policy tools are used in governing nanotech-
nology, how are they implemented, where are they
included, and how are they further developed?
However, regulatory cultures are not taken for
granted, nor are issues, actors and practices considered
to be stable and separate entities. Rather, regulatory
discourses and the social order are framed as being
coproduced, as issues and practices emerge in relation
to actors and vice versa [85]. In this notion, the analysis
of regulatory cultures looks at specific discourses, mea-
sures or modes of governance that shape the interaction
between actors, issues and practices in specific ways.
Section 2 provides a chronological overview of
three phases of the regulatory discourse of nano-
technology between 2000 and 2013. Here, specific
measures and modes of governance are discussed
that have shaped the regulatory cultures of nano-
technology in the three countries and the European
Union.3 Based on this overview, section 3 discusses
those specific measures and modes of governance
according to the three categories: issues, actors and
practices. Section 4 focuses on the temporal dimen-
sion of the regulatory discourse based on the three
categories in three phases. Here, the shift of the
topics and the configuration of actors within the
three phases is outlined, as is the way that legisla-
tion, self-regulatory and informal approaches have
been established. The final section 5 presents the
categorisation of the observed issues, actors and
practices into two regulatory cultures with different
culture-specific strategies.
Three Phases in the Regulatory Discourse
from 2000–2013
This section gives a chronological overview of the reg-
ulatory discourse on nanotechnology in Germany, Aus-
tria and Switzerland as well as in the EU between 2000
and 2013. This discourse can be seen as having three
phases that may overlap at times but are largely distinct:
an early phase of a broad thematic discussion of nano-
technology by a relatively small range of participants, a
middle phase of intensive and broad thematic discourse
with a wide range of actors and a late phase with a
specific thematic emphasis on nano-materials and a
simultaneously extended range of participants.
The study has further showed that technology assess-
ment in all analysed countries played an important role
at the beginning of the discourse and thus chances, risks
and the need for research were centrally negotiated. The
discourse became more intensive in a phase of broad-
ened participatory occasions, which included stake-
holders as well as civil society. At the end of our anal-
ysis, the regulatory discourse decreased and narrowed
its thematic scope to the environment, health and safety
issues (EHS) of nano-materials and was mainly con-
ducted by the relevant social and political actors.
The Early Phase: Research, Innovation and Assessment
In Germany and Switzerland, the regulatory discourse
on nanotechnology emerged in the years 2000 and 2001
and intensified in 2005–2007. Both countries saw par-
liamentary interventions and debates. The first issues
within the German Bundestag focused on the state and
development of nanotechnology, its opportunities, risks
and specific scientific guidelines. Further issues
discussed in the Bundestag covered nanotechnology
research and development and nano-specific regulation
relating to the protection of consumers, health, data and
the environment.4 Furthermore, the research policy ad-
ministrations faced a phase of orientation in which the
definition of the research area as well as the precise
formulation and financial funding of support
programmes were still fairly open.5 The Swiss Parlia-
ment’s National Council discussed and rejected the set-
3 This analysis focuses on selected initiatives and measures with
regard to the governance of nanotechnology. They were selected in
an exemplary way according to their documentation in related
literature, and according to whether they were observed and men-
tioned in interviews and participant observation conducted by the
authors in the three countries. Therefore, the discussed measures
have served as examples or cases upon which to build the argu-
ment rather than providing a comprehensive list of all relevant
governance measures. This has never been the aim of the authors.
Therefore, the qualitative approach selected for this study leads to
the consequence that some measures are analysed while others are
missing.
4 See also printed matter [43–46] and plenary protocol [119] of the
German Parliament.
5 On that, see e.g. [12–14].
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up of an advisory board on new technologies with the
aim of covering political and ethical questions, chances,
risks, social implications, national and international co-
operation as well as military applications.6
In 2002 the German Federal Ministry of Education
and Research (BMBF) published a position paper,
showing the status of an early “action plan” without
explicitly using this term [12]. In 2004 the BMBF
published another position paper, which was—although
the title once again failed to indicate this—considered as
the first nanotechnology action plan of Germany [13].7
Herein, the BMBF stated that there was no need for a
separate regulation of nanotechnology [14].
From 2003 onwards, the first publicly funded re-
search policy analyses and technology assessment
(TA) studies (e.g. [9, 115])8 were released in Germany
and Switzerland. Furthermore, private actors began to
publish assessment studies (e.g. [105, 134]). The
publicly-commissioned studies in Germany focused on
TA [115], financed by the Parliament, and on innovation
and technology analyses with a focus on economic
potential [101]. Further studies covering sustainability
effects and health were both supported by the BMBF [1,
73]. In addition, a research policy position paper on
nanotechnology analysed its market potential and
stressed the strategic need to exploit it for the German
economy [13].
Another study, funded from public resources, fo-
cused on nano-materials, their definitions and scientific
development and was conducted by the TA institution
European Academy for Research and Assessment of
Consequences of Scientific and Technical Developments
[129].
In Switzerland, the national Centre for Technology
Assessment (TA Swiss) issued a report on
nanotechnology in medicine [9]. Private studies like
those conducted by the Swiss reinsurance company
Swiss Re and the think tank International Risk Gover-
nance Council (IRGC) analysed nanoscience and nano-
technology from a wide thematic range as well as nano-
materials and their potential toxicity (e.g. [78, 134]).
In Germany, the Chemical Industry Association
(VCI) and the multinational chemical company BASF
developed a code of conduct for the safe handling of
nano-materials at the workplace [4]. While many of
these early studies showed a wide range of visions,
applications, implications, hazards and risks, particular
attention was paid to the potential adverse effects of
nano-materials on health and environment.
At the EU level, the regulatory discourse started
when the EU Commission published a nanotechnology
strategy in 2004 [37] and released an action plan in 2005
[38]. In these communications, the EU Commission
assessed nanotechnology as a core research and devel-
opment field and put emphasis on the technology’s
potential for international competition and economic
leadership. The EU Commission further argued that
the existing regulatory framework was sufficient to cov-
er the hazards and risks and that any regulation must be
embedded into the existing legal framework. Further-
more, the Commission advertised for a comprehensive
review to be carried out of the adequacy of the existing
law to cover nanotechnology [32, 33].9
Discourses in this phase were mainly conducted in
promise- and expectation-oriented innovation rhetoric.
They mainly focused on nano-materials and nano-
phenomena and already covered a wide range of issues.
This phase was also framed by futuristic discourses and
‘speculative’—as the scientific community sometimes
called them— future scenarios of nanotechnology (cf.
e.g. also [71, 98, 110]). Particularly in the U.S., such
visions played an important role in attracting the initial
focus of the science policy discourse to nanotechnology
and in allocating public funding to the field of nano-
technology in around the early 2000s (e.g. [131, 133]).
They were initially taken up in other countries, like in
the parliamentary discourses in Germany and Switzer-
land (see above), and particularly influenced the first
German nanotechnology strategy [12]. Moreover, it is
difficult to make statements about the role that the early,
visionary debates about nanotechnologies played as
6 See Swiss National Council postulate submitted by National
Councillor HansWidmer (SP) of 14.12.2000, in which he requests
the Swiss Federal Council to establish a council for new technol-
ogies and Swiss National Council request by National Councillor
Barbara Haering (SP) from 01.12.2004 to the Swiss Federal
Council regarding potential environmental and health risks from
military uses of nanotechnology (http://www.parlament.ch/d/
suche/seiten/geschaefte.aspx?ge-sch_id=20003686/visited 04.06.
2014).
7 In Germany the term “action plan”was first explicitly used in the
BMBF [15] publication.
8 The studies were financed by the Federal Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (BMU) and by the Swiss organisation for technology
assessment TA Swiss, respectively. 9 For this and further analysis see [62].
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regards future regulatory strategies. We can only specu-
late on the role of visions or ‘speculative ethics’ in the
nanotechnology discourse. Nanotechnology might
have been put on the political agenda because the
visions about molecular nanotechnologies and its po-
tential impacts created substantial media awareness,
not least in quality newspapers.10 The visionary dis-
course might also have prompted groups that were
more interested in allocating funding to ‘conventional
nanotechnologies’ to develop counter-narratives,
highlighting the everyday use and more current op-
portunities of nanotechnologies.11 The early nano-
technology debates addressed more prominently eth-
ical issues like distributional justice or the role of
science in economic policy, topics that almost entirely
disappeared from later nanotechnology discourses
(see e.g. [99]). Furthermore, the visionary discourse
attracted the interest of German environmental orga-
nisations. In discussing the importance of nanotech-
nologies as a future topic for their work, they consid-
ered several visions to be overly speculative. At the
same time, they discovered the potential of other
visions and found parallels and differences between
nanomaterials and chemicals policy problems.
Chemicals policy, in turn, is a core area of activity
(and expertise) for civil society organisations, above
all in Germany. The reframing of nanotechnology as
nanomaterials resulted in benefiting both the influen-
tial proponents of nanotechnology research funding,
who were mainly based in academia and industry, and
its critics, who came mostly from environmental or-
ganisations. In this notion, nanotechnology became a
development that was related to the broader political
agenda of dissident organisations.
As the next section shows, visions lost their
importance in the middle phase of the regulatory
discourse. For example, they no longer played any
significant role in the nanotechnology action plans
or implementation reports of the EU, Switzerland,
Germany and Austria that emerged in 2004 and
later (e.g. [15, 29, 34]).
The Middle Phase: Intensifying Discourses
in the Context of Participation
For a relatively short phase between 2005 and 2007, the
regulatory discourses in Germany and Switzerland be-
came fairly intensive. This was also the time when the
discourses started in Austria. In this phase, besides the
ongoing research policy issues, the regulatory dis-
courses in all the analysed countries started to focus on
favourable applications of nanotechnology for human
health and the environment. Particularly in Germany,
the research policy discourses were associated with a
focus on nanotechnology research and development in
applications considered to be particularly relevant to the
economy and society, like nano-electronics, automotive
manufacturing, optical technologies and life sciences.
Like in the early phase in Germany and Switzerland,
the regulatory discourses in Austria began with a tech-
nology assessment study. While nanotechnology impli-
cations were discussed in a wide thematic range in
Austria, the discourses in the two other countries started
to focus more on concrete applications and implications
such as the environmental, health and safety (EHS)
implications of nano-materials. In this phase, the visions
almost entirely disappeared from the regulatory dis-
course, something Lösch [99] descr ibes as
‘defuturization’.
In Germany, the involved actors particularly
consisted of the federal institutions in charge of eco-
nomic and innovation policies. Since 2006, institutions
with protective functions (environment, health, employ-
ment and consumer protection) have increasingly en-
tered public and regulatory discourses. Thus all parlia-
mentary groups in the Bundestag, the federal govern-
ment as a whole, several federal ministries (in particular
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research BMBF
and the Federal EnvironmentMinistry BMU), as well as
higher federal authorities and departmental research in-
stitutes like the Federal Environment Agency (UBA),
the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(BAuA) and the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment
(BfR), became involved in the discourses. Further actors
consisted of environment and consumer protection
agencies like the environmental association BUND
and the Federation of German Consumer Organisations
(vzbv), as well as industry associations like the Associ-
ation of the Chemical Industry (VCI) and the German
Federation of Food Law and Food Science (BLL). In
this phase, the German government funded governance-
10 E.g. the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, one of the most influ-
ential daily newspapers in Germany, published a series of articles
by futurists, scientists and engineers about nanofutures, which was
widely discussed in political circles.
11 For example, this later led to the ‘nano for…’ strategies of the
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).
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oriented, EHS-related research studies. In this context,
the Society for Institutional Analysis (sofia) Darmstadt
and the Ökoinstitut Freiburg published for example a
legal opinion [66] and the Karlsruhe Institute for Tech-
nology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) is-
sued several studies (e.g. [63, 70, 71]). In addition, a
number of research programmes in the fields of nano-
toxicology, standardisation and instrumentation with
public and private participation were initiated and lead-
ing scientists regularly took part in the evolving risk
discourses. In parallel, the multinational corporation
BASF launched a dialogue forum on EHS issues of
nano-materials in Germany. The two sessions organised
so far aimed to share nanotechnology issues with trade
unions, civil society organisations, scientists and repre-
sentatives of other companies (suppliers and customers)
and resulted in the formulation of two individual posi-
tion papers [5, 6]. In addition, BASF developed a work-
place safety guideline for nano-materials in 2006 [4].
Besides manufacturers, the German Association of
Chemical Industries (VCI) also published positions
and recommendations for the handling of nano-
materials [137] and developed a guideline for workplace
safety together with the Federal Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health [7]. They updated their guide-
lines in 2012 [8]. The Germanmanufacturing industry is
particularly active as compared with the other analysed
countries and has influenced both the development of
regulatory discourse and some governance choices of
the German government, for example that the Ministry
of the Environment did not develop a voluntary
reporting scheme as has been the case in the U.S. and
the UK.
In Germany and Switzerland, first participatory pro-
cesses were carried out. While the German Federal
Ministry for the Environment (BMU) initiated a stake-
holder dialogue on environmental protection and occu-
pational health and safety, TA Swiss carried out three
focus group hearings with the public and one involving
stakeholder groups on nanotechnology in a broad the-
matic scope [25, 120]. The German BMU stakeholder
dialogue, initiated by an initiative of the former Federal
Minister of the Environment, was turned into the
NanoKommission in 2006.
Then, the German NanoKommission was introduced
by the Federal Government as the national dialogue
forum. Its administration was assigned to the Environ-
ment Ministry (BMU). Although perceived as a single
entity, the “NanoKommission” actually consisted of two
consecutive commissions with partly different member-
ships and different key areas of activity [94]. The first
NanoKommission (2006–2008) comprised 15 people
representing science, economy, politics and NGOs and
was supported by three working groups (each com-
prising approximately 20 members from all active
stakeholder groups) focusing on issues such as
“chances for environment and health”, “risks and
safety research” as well as “guidelines for respon-
sible handling of nano-materials”. This phase was
followed almost seamlessly by the second working
period from 2009–2011, described either as the
“second phase of NanoKommission” or as “the
second NanoKommission” [94].
In 2006, the German Bundestag particularly
discussed issues such as benefits and risks, environment
and health protection, research policy, and food.12 In
August 2006, three higher federal authorities, the Envi-
ronment Agency (UBA), the Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (BAuA) and the Institute for Risk
Assessment (BfR), published a joint research strategy
[18]. In the same year, the UBA published a background
paper on opportunities and risks of nanotechnology for
human health and the environment [135] and the Fed-
eral Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) de-
veloped the NanoCare information platform on synthet-
ic nano-particles.13 Environmental organisations also
published reports on issues such as environmental and
health protection (e.g. [23, 24]). Furthermore, in No-
vember 2006, the BMBF as lead ministry presented the
“Nano-Initiative – Action Plan 2010” within the frame-
work of the HighTech Strategy of the German Federal
Government [15]. In this initiative, the BMBF described
the requirements of the market success of a German
“knowledge lead” in various areas of nanotechnology
and presented an expanded and cross-departmental ac-
tion frame. It further specified the aim of the German
government to establish a national dialogue board: the
NanoKommission (see above).
In Switzerland, the regulatory discourses were
characterised by several discussions in the Parliament,
covering issues like public health and the environment,
the need for a regulatory framework, the support of
innovation as well as the call for a national research
funding programme for an in-depth analysis of potential
12 Cf. printed matter [47, 48] of the German Parliament.
13 Meanwhile transferred into the follow-up project DaNAwww.
nanopartikel.info/cms/Projekte/ NanoCare (viewed, 4.6.2013).
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risks and benefits of synthetic nano-materials and nano-
technological applications (reference to own research).
In Austria, the regulatory discourses started in 2006
with the publication of a TA report on accompanying
measures in nanotechnology commissioned by the Fed-
eral Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology
(BMVIT) and conducted by the Institute for Technology
Assessment (ITA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences
[80]. The report dealt with issues relating to the state of
knowledge, regulation, self-regulatory approaches, vol-
untary agreements and best-practice initiatives particu-
larly recommended for the field of chemicals. In paral-
lel, the study “NanoHealth – health risks of nanotech-
nology” funded by the Federal Ministry of Economy
(BMWA) and the Zukunftsfonds Steiermark was pub-
lished by BioNanoNet Styria [109]. Both projects de-
veloped joint recommendations urging the government
to adapt existing regulations, in particular those in the
fields of chemicals legislation, product liability, insur-
ance and consumer protection, and if necessary to de-
velop a new regulatory framework. Furthermore, the
authors of these studies suggested that—comparable to
other countries—EHS and ELSI research activities on
nanotechnology be initiated (cf. [80]).
The Late Phase: Flattening of Discourses and Focusing
on Materials, Environmental, Health and Safety Issues
Subsequently, the regulatory discourses in Germany and
Switzerland decreased, though they remained on a sig-
nificantly higher level than before 2006 and expanded in
Austria. In all the analysed countries, and in the EU, this
phase once again entailed an expansion of the range of
actors with a simultaneously comprehensive thematic
focus on nano-materials. The discourses focused on
issues such as the application of nano-materials in con-
sumer products, environmental, health and safety (EHS)
and related regulatory issues. The range of issues
narrowed from thematically extensive negotiations on
nano-sciences and nanotechnologies as a whole to a
rather restricted and almost exclusive concentration on
nano-materials.
In Germany, parliamentary interventions and debates
still played a major role. Thus the German Bundestag
discussed issues like regulation, the precautionary prin-
ciple, risks, occupational health and safety, consumer
protection, responsible approach, the promotion of re-
search, development and innovation, environment and
health protection, nano-silver, reporting obligations,
product register, labelling requirements, chemical regu-
lation, hazardous substances, action plan as well as
research policy and accompanying research.14 The
(first) NanoKommission of the Federal Government
published its final report in 2008 [106]. The report
developed a ‘Declaration of Principles for Responsible
Use of Nano-materials’, with the intention that the par-
ticipating stakeholders should consider it as a code of
conduct for the stakeholders participating in the nano-
dialogue. The subsequently initiated second
NanoKommission was expanded to 16 people and
slightly modified: instead of the BDI (the umbrella
Association of German Industry) and representatives
of the hard sciences, members from churches, the Min-
istry of Consumer Protection as well as lawyers were
included. The working structure remained similar and
the work of the commission was supported by four
thematic groups (“Monitoring the implementation of
the principle”, “Development of a technical guidance
for a survey and comparison of benefit and risk aspects
of nano-products”, “Examination of regulations of
nano-materials and nano-products” and “Criteria for a
preliminary assessment of nano-materials with regard to
their effects on human health and the environment” as
well as an additional working group “Sustainable nano-
technologies – Green Nano”). The working groups
consisted of 20 to 25 members each. The second
NanoKommission placed a stronger thematic focus on
regulatory issues, which reduced the chances of
reaching a consensus, particularly in the thematic groups
1 and 3. In 2011, the second NanoKommission pub-
lished its final report, which mainly focuses on the better
implementation of the five principles for responsible
handling of nano-materials [16]. Furthermore, the report
provides the basis for a guideline to oppose the benefits
and risks of nano-products and criteria to assess nano-
materials with regard to their environmental, health and
safety implications. It further consists of an opinion on
the need for regulation and recommends developing a
guideline on green nanotechnologies ‘Green Nano’
[17]. Both reports showed that governance strategies
issued by the NanoKommission focused on risk man-
agement approaches rather than on soft or hard law.
The Federal Environmental Agency published an
updated edition of the background paper of 2006
[135]. Further governmental and non-governmental
14 On these issues see e.g. printed matter [49, 51, 53, 54] of the
German Parliament.
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organisations such as the Federation for Food Law and
Food Science and the Federation of German Consumer
Organisations as well as the Federal Government
discussed issues like food and consumer protection.15
Regulatory issues were discussed in a legal opinion
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Environment
(BMU) and composed by the Ökoinstitut Freiburg and
the Society for Institutional Analysis Darmstadt, pub-
lished in December 2006 [108]. This report focused on
potential adaptations of the existing legal framework to
the needs of nanotechnology. In particular, this report
suggested adapting the European chemical regulation
REACH to nano-materials and explicitly mentioning
them, reducing the product volume from one ton per
year for the registration of nano-materials and develop-
ing specific test and monitoring approaches. Further-
more, the report also suggested more voluntary gover-
nance forms such as encouraging self-regulation and
work on standardisation (ibid.). The suggestion to adapt
the chemical regulation was also picked up on in reports
by the Federal Government and by consumer groups, in
the latter case particularly with regard to consumer
protection.16 The Association of the Chemical Industry
(VCI) – in cooperation with the trade unions and occu-
pational safety organisations – further advanced the
issue of occupational safety and health. In this context,
the VCI and companies and authorities like the BAuA
developed another code of conduct for the chemical
industry with respect to the handling of nano-materials
in the workplace and guidelines for workplace safety
involving nano-materials [7, 137].
In 2011, the second NanoKommission of the Federal
Government published and presented its final report and
the working group reports in a public discussion [107].
Furthermore, the State Committee of Experts on the
Environment analysed the environmental implications
of nanotechnology in a special report [52].
Further topics of the German regulatory discourses
after 2010 included questions like environmental and
health protection and a nano-product register, whose
feasibility was analysed by the Ökoinstitut Freiburg in
a study published in 2010 [113]. At the beginning of
2013, the Federal Departmental Research Establish-
ments presented the initial review of their joint research
strategy on health and environmental risks of nano-
materials, which simultaneously provided an outlook
regarding the further strategic alignment of nano-EHS
research [136].
In Switzerland, the regulatory discourses after 2006
focused almost exclusively on synthetic nano-materials.
Thus the Federal Office for Environment (BAFU) and
the Federal Office of Public Health (BAG), together
with invited authors and coordinated by the
Innovationsgesellschaft, composed a basic report. This
report covered issues like innovation potential, chances,
environmental and health risks and the need for accom-
panying research and dialogue [26]. On the basis of this
report, the Swiss government (the Federal Council)
adopted the action plan “Synthetic Nano-Materials” in
2008.
This action plan outlined the Swiss government’s
assessment that no additional regulation on the legisla-
tive level was needed. However, the government an-
nounced that it would be making adjustments at the
ordinance level. The report concluded with four recom-
mendations: 1. communicating and promoting the pub-
lic dialogue on benefits and risks of nanotechnology, 2.
supporting scientific and methodological conditions for
identifying and avoiding potential harmful effects on
human health and the environment, 3. establishing reg-
ulatory conditions for the responsible development of
nanotechnology, 4. better use of existing funding instru-
ments [29].
In 2008, the Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNF) launched a national research programme, ‘Op-
portunities and Risks of Nano-materials’, with a strong
focus on hard science and toxicological research.17 In
2008, the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences pub-
lished a policy document on nanotechnology [118]. This
paper presented an inventory of ethical, legal and social
implications (ELSI) related to nano-science and nano-
technology as well as risk, social science and cultural
studies research in Switzerland [123]. Furthermore, this
policy document recommended the promotion of re-
search, risk and ELSI research, independently of the
private sector, as well as proactive exchange between
science and society.
Issues discussed in the Swiss parliament covered the
question of a need for statutory regulations, risk and
accompanying research as well as the application of
15 See the following policy documents and printed matter of the
German Parliament [11, 50, 139].
16 See also printed matter [49] of the German Parliament.
17 See: 22.10.2008: tender of the national research programme
NFP 64 by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) (www.
nfp64.ch, viewed 17.7.2012).
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the precautionary principle, governmental activities to
identify risks, occupational and product safety, disposal
and consumer information.18
Moreover, in the years 2011–2013, the responsible
authorities in Switzerland developed a number of infor-
mal (soft law) measures such as the creation of a pre-
cautionarymatrix, voluntary guidelines for the industrial
identification of nanotechnology-specific risks, and a
voluntary code of conduct for workplace safety, safety
data sheets, guidelines for disposal, recycling and label-
ling, and a dialogue platform on consumer information
on synthetic nano-materials in products and the info-
nano website.19 In particular, Switzerland introduced a
‘registration and product register for chemicals and
nano-materials’ in 2012 [2]. Since then, the registration
and notification of nano-materials requires additional
information with regard to their identity, particle size,
shape and composition. Regarding cosmetics, Switzer-
land plans to harmonise its cosmetic law with that of the
EU in 2015. Meanwhile, nano-materials in cosmetics
can be declared on a voluntary basis.20
Self-regulatory initiatives were also developed in
Swi tze r l and in the yea rs 2005–2008 . The
Innovationsgesellschaft, a private consulting company
with a focus on risk management and safety issues of
nano-materials, together with additional partners such as
TÜV Süd and Interessengemeinschaft Detailhandel
Schweiz, thus established the platform “Nano-Regula-
tion” in 2005, the certifiable risk management and mon-
itoring system CENARIOS and a principles-based code
of conduct in 2007, all with a focus on nano-materials.21
In the 2007 code of conduct, the Swiss retail trade
interest association declared that the signing members
would take responsibility for their own actions, ask for
nano-material-related information within the supply
chain and provide transparent information to consumers
[77]. In the same year, the International Risk
Governance Council IRGC, located in Geneva, devel-
oped a Risk Governance Framework for nanotechnolo-
gy [78]. This framework consisted of a conceptual
scheme to analyse nanotechnology regarding interna-
tional regulatory and science policy aspects with the
aim of supporting riskmanagement for decisionmakers.
This scheme particularly covered general aspects and
visions of future generation nano-materials that lead to a
rather broad and vague governance approach (ibid.).
In Austria, the BMVIT engaged the ITA with the
project NanoTrust in 2007, with the aim of identifying
knowledge gaps and potential regulatory deficits and
offering a discussion platform.22 At the same time,
parliamentary initiatives and debates emerged. They
covered issues such as regulation, occupational safety
and health, health and the environment, food, cos-
metics, labelling, precaution and cosmetics.23 In
2009, the Federal Ministry of the Environment
(BMLFUW) established a platform on which stake-
holders and representatives from the administration,
NGOs and science met on a regular basis. In 2010, the
Austrian government adopted the Austrian Nanotech-
nology Action Plan (ÖNAP), prepared by working
groups from the BMLFUW nanotechnology platform.
The ÖNAP identified three strategic fields for gov-
ernmental activity: the environment, health and occu-
pational safety. The ÖNAP further provided recom-
mendations for the review and securing of the legal
framework and worked out the legal situation in Aus-
tria and the EU. This particularly concerned the field
of occupational safety and consumer protection. Fur-
thermore, the ÖNAP recommended examining
whether nano-labelling or a nano-register would be
needed and, if necessary, launching a corresponding
initiative on the EU level. Other recommendations
consisted of coordinating with international legal de-
velopments (REACH, definition, standardisation) and
promoting voluntary measures to strengthen the pre-
cautionary and polluter-pays principles. Furthermore,
the establishment of a NanoInformationsPlatform
(NIP) was scheduled to enable the exchange of infor-
mation on nano-governance and regulation within the
administration and with the public (NIP went online
in late 2012).24
18 See e.g. Swiss National Council motion by National Counsellor
Maya Graf (gps) on the statutory regulation of nanotechnology
and the launch of a national risk research programme 11.05.2006
and postulate from then National Counsellor Didier Burkhalter
13.06.2006, regarding the promotion of innovation (see http://
www.parlament.ch/D/Suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx? gesch_id=
20114201/visited 04.06.2014).
19 See http://www.bag.admin.ch/nanotechnologie/12167/12168/
index.html? lang=de and ht tp : / /www.bag.admin.ch/
nanotechnologie/12171/index.html?lang=de (visited 04.06.2014).
20 See also [27, 28] and ht tp: / /www.bag.admin.ch/
nanotechnologie/index.html?lang=de, viewed 21.11.2013).
21 See http://innovationsgesellschaft.ch/ (visited 28.11.13).
22 http://nanotrust.ac.at.
23 For this and further references see [61].
24 http://nanoinformation.at.
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In Austria in 2010, the issues of the environment,
research, economy and health thus dominated the regu-
latory discourses. Further governmental activities were
mainly concerned with participation in the regulatory
processes at the EU level and with monitoring of the
Austrian market, in particular of consumer products, but
not with any concrete regulatory action [94]. After the
implementation of the ÖNAP, EHS research was pro-
moted to some extent.25 The TA project NanoTrust has
constantly been active in feeding the ongoing debates
and was prolonged twice (in 2010 and 2013). It is now a
project funded not only by BMVIT, but also by three
other federal ministries26. In 2013, the informal working
party coordinating the NIP became institutionalised as
the Austrian “Nano-Informations-Kommission”, man-
aged by the Federal Ministry of Health, and chaired by
an ITA researcher.
Furthermore, the authorities of German-speaking
countries responsible for labour protection, environ-
ment protection, health protection, consumer protec-
tion etc. formed networks in a more formalised struc-
ture. Thus the annual International Nano Authorities
Dialogue (Nano-Behördendialog) was established,
where representatives of the protective authorities of
Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Liechtenstein –
as a rule in the presence of guests from science,
economy, and NGOs – exchange views on current
developments and regulatory perspectives in
nanotechnology.
At the EU level,27 discourse intensified after the
Commission issued the First Implementation Report
2005–2007 on the action plan [34]. In the report,
public health, safety, environmental and consumer
protection issues were the main regulatory targets.
Nevertheless, the Commission maintained that the
existing legislative framework, in principle, was
suitable and adequate. One year later, in 2008, the
Commission published a communication on regula-
tory aspects of nano-materials [36]. This communi-
cation still argued that, in general, the existing legal
framework covers hazardous implications and risks
emerging from the use of nano-materials. Parallel to
these activities however, the Commission adopted
the first nano-specific legal act, a non-binding rec-
ommendation on a code of conduct for responsible
nanosciences and nanotechnologies research,
consisting of principles and guidelines for member
states, public and private actors involved and inter-
ested in nanotechnology research [35].28 Further-
more, the Commission also established a stakeholder
dialogue (“Safety for Success”).29
Until 2009, the discourse was as good as
monopolised by the European Commission and the
prevailing argument was that the legislative frame-
work was adequate for governing nanotechnologies.
A turning point, however, came in the form of the
Resolution of the European Parliament on regulatory
aspects of nanomaterials [114] in answer to the
Commission’s communication on regulatory aspects
of nanomaterials [35]. With the resolution the Par-
liament partly took over thematic leadership from
the Commission. In its resolution, the Parliament
challenged the assessment of the EU Commission
concerning the adequacy of the existing legal frame-
work and demanded comprehensive legal steps to
adapt the existing regulation to new nano-materials.
The Parliament particularly confirmed the “no data,
no market” principle developed within the context of
the European chemicals regulation REACH,30 and
insisted on its enforcement also in the field of nano-
materials. The Parliament also requested political
and institutional reactions such as the establishment
of a “nanotechnology coordinator” to link the poli-
cies of the various Directorates General.31
In 2009, the Commission issued the Second Imple-
mentation Report [39]. At this point the Commission
acknowledged that some areas of legislation would need
adaptation. The Commission referred to chemicals, nov-
el food, food additives and cosmetics as being the main
areas of regulatory interest. Important advisory
25 www.ffg.at/nano-environment-health-and-safety.
26 Namely the federal ministries for the environment, for health
and for consumer protection.
27 For the developments up to 2010, further analysis and refer-
ences see [61].
28 For a further analysis of the code of conduct see [19, 60,
138]
29 For the first of four organised dialogues between 2007 and
2011, see http://ec.europa.eu/health/nanotechnology/events/ev_
20071025_en.htm
30 Regulation EC 1907/2006.
31 For further analysis of the European Parliament Resolution see
[61].
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functions were taken over by the European Group on
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE)32 and
by Scientific Committees (see in particular the Scientific
Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health
Risks – SCENHIR and the Scientific Committee on
Consumer Products – SCCP)33 as well as by European
agencies (such as the European Chemicals Agency –
ECHA or the European Food Safety Authority – EFSA)
which composed various reports on nanomaterials (e.g.
[56, 57]). In 2010, the STOA panel of the European
Parliament launched a separate TA study on
NanoSafety.34 In addition, various research groups
funded by the EU started analysing nanotechnology
regulation (e.g. NanoCode)35.
From 2009 onwards, the regulatory discourse in the
EU was mainly dominated by the Commission and the
Parliament and focused on regulatory issues of nano-
materials. The discourses involved further EU institu-
tions, like the EU Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee,36 although their role was minor.
Partly in response to the European Parliament Reso-
lution [114], the European Union basically started to
develop nano-specific provisions from 2009 onwards.37
These regulatory efforts so far concerned primarily
food,38 cosmetics39 and chemicals40.41 The nano-
specific provisions within these regulations follow a
similar model: the regulations regularly define nano-
materials and contain notification and labelling require-
ments.42 In the area of chemicals regulation, nano-
specific adjustments (REACH regulation and CLP reg-
ulation) have been discussed in detail and negotiated,
though so far only implementations at the application
level have been conducted.43
In addition to these hard law efforts, the European
Commission adopted a further non-binding recommen-
dation on the definition of nano-materials.44
The following section discusses how the con-
stellations of the most prominent actors, issues and
practices in the discourses of the three analysed
countries and the EU have shifted over the three
phases.
Issues, Actors and Practices in the Three Phases
Issues: From Nanotechnology to Nano-Material
and from ESLI to EHS
The early phase (2000–2005) was characterised by a
broad thematic scope in the negotiations of nano-
sciences and nanotechnologies in Germany and Swit-
zerland and at the EU level. Those discourses comprised
issues such as economic potential, promotion of inno-
vation, research policy, sustainability, nano-materials,
nano-phenomena and visions, as well as potential im-
plications. The discourse on implications initially cov-
ered more general and higher-level areas such as ethical,
legal and social implications (ELSI). During the middle
phase, the issues discussed shifted in all the analysed
areas in two respects; first, there was a shift from nano-
technology to nano-materials and, second, a shift in
accompanying research from ethical, legal and social
implications (ELSI) to environmental health and safety
issues (EHS). The late phase was characterised by a
comprehensive and stabilised thematic focus on nano-
materials used in consumer products and specific related
(EHS) regulatory issues such as precaution as well as on
questions of definition and nomenclature. More broadly
scoped and visionary issues discussed in early TA stud-
32 See in particular [58]
33 See e.g. [125–128]
34 www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/cms/studies (visited 13.08.2013).
35 http://www.nanocode.eu.
36 For further references see [61].
37 Nano-specific provision can already be found in EC 1333/2008
(food additives). Art 12 states the following: “When a food addi-
tive is already included in a Community list and there is a signif-
icant change in its production methods or in the starting materials
used, or there is a change in particle size, for example through
nanotechnology, the food additive prepared by those new methods
or materials shall be considered as a different additive and a new
entry in the Community lists or a change in the specifications shall
be required before it can be placed on the market.”
38 Regulation EU 1169/2011 (food information).
39 Regulation EC 1223/2009 (chemicals).
40 Regulation EU 528/2012 (biocidal products).
41 For the early developments up to 2010 with further references
see e.g. [61]. For labelling requirements see e.g. [59]. See also the
directives on electrical and electronic equipment (Directive EU
2011/65) and on waste electrical and electronical equipment (Di-
rective EU 2012/19).
42 For further analysis and references see [59] and the proposal for
a Regulation on medical devices COM [34] 542.
43 For further references, see e.g. [61] and http://echa.europa.eu/
view-article/-/journal_content/title/the-iuclid-user-manual-for-
nanomaterials-has-been-updated (visited 14.06.2014).
44 2011/696/EU.
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ies and public debates, such as human enhancement and
nano-medicine, became less important in the late phase.
Actors: Expanding the Range from Political Institutions
to non-Governmental and Commercial Organisations
The spectrum of actors involved in the discourses ex-
panded throughout the three phases and shifted from
political institutions traditionally involved in regulatory
issues to various societal and non-governmental actors.
The regulatory discourses in the early phase was partic-
ularly characterised by activities of the related authori-
ties, members of parliament, TA organisations and ac-
tors of the private sector such as chemical companies
and their industry association in Germany; and of rein-
surance companies, advisors and think tanks in Switzer-
land. In the middle phase, the spectrum of involved
authorities, parliamentary groups and organisations of
the private sector widened. New actors such as NGOs
and, in Germany, a national advisory board composed of
the most important stakeholders, stepped onto the stage.
This led to a shift from actors who first and foremost
framed innovation and technology issues to actors who
focused more on environment, health and safety related
issues, such as members of the related authorities and
civil society organisations. This shift was further accen-
tuated in the late phase, in which additional actors
specialised in issues such as nano-materials, environ-
ment, health and safety issues, such as consumer orga-
nizations, entered the discourse.
The analysis of the actors involved throughout the
three phases showed that it was in particular actors
representing non-governmental and commercial organi-
sations that gained in importance. Due to their openness
to soft law and discursive regulatory approaches, they
obtained increased influence in nano-related regulatory
issues. In Germany, for example, the association VCI,
the chemicals company BASF and the environmental
association BUND actively participated in the early
phase of the discourse and became members of the
NanoKommission—the national dialogue committee
that considerably influenced German nanotechnology
policies. This enabled such actors to integrate their
objectives, interests and intentions at the core of political
decision-making.
Discourses on legally binding and hard law mea-
sures, like the proposed amendments to the EU
chemicals legislation REACH and the idea of
implementing reporting and communication tools on a
mandatory level, showed a profound gap between the
interests and positions of the various stakeholder groups.
It has not been possible to obtain political consensus so
far, neither within nation-states with distinct stakeholder
differences as regards national regulation nor between
nation-states with different economic and political pref-
erence structures for European regulation.
Practices: ‘Governance turn’ or ‘Hard law shift’?
Our analysis of the regulatory discourse on nanotech-
nology showed that self-regulatory and soft law prac-
tices in particular played an important role, such as
assessment studies, action plans, safety recommenda-
tions, guidelines, precautionary matrix and research-
policy papers, cooperative forms of communication
and negotiation such as stakeholder dialogues and dia-
logue platforms, as well as codes of conduct, product
guidelines and certification systems. In contrast to
modes of governance based on traditional statutory reg-
ulations, these new governance forms dominated the
discourse throughout all phases and gained in impor-
tance over time in all the analysed countries.45 The EU,
however, followed an approach between 2004 and 2009
which tried to foster the adoption of soft law measures
(such as the EC CoC). Due to some pressing initiatives
of the European Parliament, the EU started to implement
nano-specific provisions (e.g. cosmetics, food labelling,
biocidal products). In this regard, there is a coexistence
at the EU level of two different approaches (a mix of soft
and hard law), though EU law in this field seems to be
moving (slowly) towards more detailed regulation in
several domains and sectors.
However, with regard to more formalised steering
approaches and schemes, such as codes of conduct,
guidelines and monitoring instruments, the countries
showed some differences. While such forms have not
as yet been developed in Austria, their individual shapes
and the actors involved differed considerably in Germa-
ny and Switzerland. In Germany, mainly manufacturers
in cooperation with associations and authorities devel-
oped such schemes (BASF, VCI, BAuA), while in Swit-
zerland this was mainly done by think tanks and tertiary
sector firms, like re-insurance and consulting firms, the
latter also and in cooperation with authorities (IG-DHS,
Innovationsgesellschaft, IRGC and SwissRe).
45 This is particularly applicable at state level (cf. [62]).
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Two Regulatory Cultures in Governing
Nanotechnology
The analysis of the regulatory discourse on nanotech-
nology in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the EU
showed that the discussed issues, the involved actors
and the observed practices corresponded in many re-
spects. This might be due to the strong link between the
three countries and the EU in various regulatory fields
related to nanotechnology. However, the comparison of
the thematic focus in the analysed cases showed two
different governance approaches: on the national level,
besides the conventional, visionary and innovation-
driven discourses, technology assessment was an early
issue in all the three analysed countries. TA issues were
followed by a general and overall focus on substance
risks and on potentially adverse implications of nano-
materials, mainly in consumer products. Furthermore,
all three countries showed governance approaches based
on soft law, self-regulation and forms of new gover-
nance. None of the analysed countries used such ap-
proaches based on hard law, however.
At the EU level, on the other hand, statutory regula-
tion was also used and the regulatory discourse focused
on both products and risks. Until 2009, the EU gover-
nance approach was based on using and adapting the
existing regulation and used soft law to foster the self-
regulatory capacities of mainly private actors (like e.g.
[35]). After 2009, selected laws were adapted to nano-
materials (e.g. cosmetics, biocidal products, food),
which is thus indicative of a product-oriented approach.
In this sense, the EU Commission prioritises the general
regulatory framework or the incremental approach,
which provides for an ongoing and case-specific intro-
duction and implementation of nanotechnology-related
issues in the existing legal framework as opposed to the
idea of establishing an entirely new regulatory frame-
work for nano-materials [64].
In addition to adapting the existing legal framework,
the European Commission also introduced modes of
governance based on more informal instruments of a
soft law nature. While the modes of governance based
on statutory law (or the hard law measures) focused on
nanotechnology products and developments, such as
cosmetics, food and biocides, the soft law measures
and the new modes of governance mainly concentrated
on risks. This was the case with the EU CoC as well as
with the recommendation for a definition of nano-
materials.
In addition to the risk-based orientation within the
nation states, the regulatory culture of the EU is
characterised here as risk-based and product-oriented.
Therefore, while governance measures in the individual
countries primarily focused on potentially hazardous
implications and risks, those on the EU level also fo-
cused on products. These two approaches cannot be
clearly distinguished from each other, rather they are
intertwined and aspects of both can be found in all the
analysed countries. In this notion, ‘regulatory cultures’
are not stable entities, as the boundaries between the
various political spaces are vague and overlapping. This
is particularly true of Germany and Austria as EU mem-
bers, but also of the non-member Switzerland. In con-
clusion, this study argues that risk-based regulatory
culture approaches could have been observed in all the
analysed countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland)
as well as on the EU level. A product-oriented regula-
tory culture approach was only observed on the EU
level, however.
Besides these more general, issue-focused cultural
characteristics of the regulatory discourse in the
analysed countries and at the EU level, this study high-
lights different strategic approaches regarding the ac-
tors involved and the regulatory practices. The risk
orientation implies a focus not only on predictable
and scientifically measurable implications but also
on hypothetical, unclear, uncertain and imprecise
aspects, which on the country level opened up a
wide range of soft law and self-regulatory ap-
proaches. Thus the analysed countries showed dif-
ferent nation-specific approaches and strategies in
the thematic and formal treatment of nanotechnolo-
gy, each linked to local political cultures:
In Germany, among the various involved actors, it
was particularly manufacturers, federal authorities and
the national dialogue committee NanoKommission
which played prominent roles. Manufacturing compa-
nies and associations developed self-regulatory instru-
ments at a relatively early stage, also in cooperation with
authorities. These activities might have an important
impact on the consensual and cooperatively oriented
German culture in governing nanotechnology. Federal
authorities were involved in such activities as well as in
assessment studies and national and international col-
laborations. The NanoKommission was particularly im-
portant in framing the overall consensus-based atmo-
sphere in the German nanotechnology discourse, despite
observable differences between the innovation-oriented
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actor groups and those primarily representing protective
aims. Thus in Germany the involvement of various
stakeholder groups constituted an important emphasis
and was institutionalised at the highest political level.
The guiding strategy in the German nanotechnology
discourse can therefore be characterised as cooperative
and self-regulatory. This approach might have its roots
in a strong tradition of a neo-corporatist culture in the
governance of science and technology and substance-
related risks (e.g. [40, 86, 130]). However, this culture
might be constantly challenged by the divergent claims
and expectations of stakeholders regarding the formal
legislation of nano-materials and nano-products.
In Austria, the regulatory discourse began later than
in the other observed places and mainly reacted to
international activities. Here, particularly TA played an
important role within the regulatory discourse. In the
context of the national action plan almost all interested
actors were incorporated, which could also be explained
by the neo-corporatist regulatory culture that is also
observable in the Austrian context. In particular the
implementation of the Nano-Informations-Plattform
constituted a cooperative procedure in which not only
authorities and agencies but also industry, social part-
ners and NGOs were included. However, the discourse
was particularly dominated by authorities with support
from TA and other interested actors. Self-regulatory and
cooperative governance approaches by non-
governmental actors, such as manufacturers, have not
been observed in Austria. The Austrian strategic orien-
tation can thus also be classified as cooperative, though
not as self-regulatory as is the case in Germany.
In Switzerland, in contrast to the other analysed
places, the regulatory discourse, particularly in the early
and middle phases, was characterised by the absence of
authorities and manufacturing companies. Instead,
mainly, tertiary sector companies composed assessment
reports and established self-regulatory approaches, such
as monitoring systems and risk management schemes
for the manufacturers. Only the last phase was
characterised by an assumption of thematic leadership
by the authorities. The relevant authorities issued an
action plan, primarily focusing on opportunities and
risks and the need for research and dialogue, contributed
to initiating a national research programme funding
EHS research and issued a precautionary matrix and
recommendations for workplace safety. This might have
been a reaction to international and supranational activ-
ities, parliamentary inquiries and activities of non-
governmental actors. Thus the Swiss regulatory dis-
courses also showed a self-regulatory orientation.
Compared to the other two countries, however, the
regulatory discourse in Switzerland, despite its regula-
tory culture oriented towards grassroots democracy, did
not show any distinct focus on participation, consensus
and cooperation. Instead, a wait-and-see strategy could
be observed on the part of governmental actors, which
initially, with the exception of the national TA organi-
sation, left nanotechnology governance basically to
non-governmental actors. They, similar to those in Ger-
many but with different actor constellations, established
self-regulatory approaches. In the late phase, these were
adopted by the authorities, which developed soft law
approaches. Therefore the strategic orientation of the
risk-based regulatory culture in Switzerland can be de-
scribed as self-regulatory and soft law-oriented.
European Union Until the EU Parliament issued its
resolution on regulatory aspects, the EU mainly
followed a risk-based culture in governing nano-
technology by focusing on non-binding, informal
governance approaches (a strategy, an action plan,
a recommendation for a code of conduct, a recom-
mendation on definitions and a TA report). After
2009, the EU also used hard law governance and
applied a product-oriented culture, focusing on
some selective sectorial fields (like food, chemicals
and cosmetics). In general, the regulatory discourse
took place within the institutional framework laid
down in the EU treaties (Table 1).
Hence these two regulatory cultures led to different
regulatory outcomes: at the level of the nation-states,
informal strategic orientations such as cooperative and
participative approaches, including stakeholder groups
Table 1 Two regulatory cultures and their strategic characteristics on supranational and national level
EU Germany Austria Switzerland
regulatory culture product based/risk based risk based risk based risk based
strategic characteristics hard law/informal cooperative/self-regulatory cooperative self-regulatory/informal
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in the regulatory discourse, were important in Germany
and Austria. Furthermore, self-regulatory approaches
were developed by authorities; in Germany often in
cooperation with manufacturers and in Switzerland
mainly after such approaches were developed by tertiary
sector companies. That is not to say that hard law will be
replaced by these soft law measures and new gover-
nance in the future; however, governance modes based
on soft law, self-regulation and new governance framed
the regulatory discourse in the analysed countries to a
considerable extent.
Modes of governance based on hard law have only
been used at the EU level. In this context, the hard law
discourse in the two member countries Germany and
Austria was delegated to a great extent to the suprana-
tional level.
The high degree of convergence in the regulatory
cultures of Germany and Austria is surprising as the
constitutional framework would suggest wider differ-
ence. Oriented to fundamental rights, the rights-based
Austrian constitution basically permits research as long
as it is not forbidden.46 By contrast, the value-based
German constitution requires governmental authorisa-
tion for hazardous technologies47 .
Why this genuine regulatory difference has not man-
ifested itself more profoundly in the analysed discourses
might be due to the various elements shaping the regu-
latory discourse in the analysed countries. In this con-
text, the influence of the constitution on subjacent reg-
ulatory levels proved to be more limited than intuitively
presumed. Furthermore, EU law might have gained in
importance as compared to national constitutions. In
addition, the individual actors involved in regulatory
discourses on emerging technologies might have ac-
quired an increasingly dominant role in framing the used
modes of governance.
The important role played at the national level by
governance based on soft law and self-regulation might
have contributed to strengthening the influence of non-
governmental actors in the regulatory discourse on
emerging science and technology fields. However, as
the genuine logics of external stakeholder groups differ
significantly from those of institutions traditionally in-
volved in the regulatory process, side aspects have
gained importance within the regulatory discourse. The-
se concern issues such as contributing their own agenda,
securing their own market, posing questions of power
and increasing influence in science policy and regulato-
ry issues, such as avoiding statutory regulation. Not only
do these aspects distract from the genuine aim of envi-
ronmental regulation, namely protecting public health
and the environment, they might also contribute to
regulatory uncertainty. Not least, this uncertainty con-
flicts with another aim of science policy, namely the
promotion of innovation.
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